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THE EARLY VIRGINIA TRADITION OF EXTRA-TEXTUAL
INTERPRETATION
Suzanna Sherry*
I.

THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION'

As we search for a usable past, it is wise to avoid too "presentist"
an approach: one should not necessarily expect a history of state
protections of liberty to provide either a familiar or a genteel source
from which to work. In the modern world, the search for state
protections of liberty generally conjures up an image of state courts
using state constitutions to prevent infringement of core civil liberties
such as freedom of the press and security from unreasonable searches
and seizures. Perusing the reports of judicial decisions from the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, however, will not yield
very many (if any) cases of that sort.
Nevertheless, the absence of reported modern civil liberties cases
does not necessarily indicate that the past is barren, only that historians' searches have been limited. This Article proposes to broaden
the search in two ways. First, rather than using the modern language
of civil liberties, the Article will discuss state court protection of what
judges in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries labelled "natural"
or "inalienable" rights, or "natural justice."
More importantly, the Article proposes to move from a textual to
an extra-textual method of interpretation. Courts faced with the
question whether a particular positive legislative enactment is consistent with higher or fundamental law can look to two broad types
of fundamental law: the written constitution, or any of several categories of unwritten law. 2 Textual interpretation focuses on the written
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota; A.B., 1976, Middlebury College; J.D., 1979,
University of Chicago.
IWhat follows in this section is a very brief summary of my earlier work on state uses of
natural law up to 1787, and federal uses of natural law up to 1820. See Sherry, The Founders'
Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CH1. L. REV. 1127 (1987). For a similar and more detailed
description of the multifarious sources of law used by the Supreme Court between 1815 and
1835, but reaching a somewhat different conclusion about the relative importance of textualism,
see 3-4 G. EDWARD WHITE, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35, at 76-156, 595-740 (1988).
2 The categories include the laws of God, the common law (largely derived incrementally from
custom and tradition), the law of nature, and natural law. The latter two were, at least during
the period of the early republic, rather distinct: the law of nature was grounded in observation
and human sentiment, while natural law was founded upon abstract reason. I am grateful to
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constitution (the text), and extra-textual interpretation considers
sources outside the written constitution. Thus modern constitutional
law is virtually exclusively textualist, insofar as courts invalidate only
statutes that conflict with the written constitution-although interpretation of the written constitution, of course, often involves an
examination of many sources of law and tradition not embodied in
the text itself. Still, fundamental law must ultimately be tied to the
written text. For example, today it would be considered an anomalyas well as a judicial usurpation of legislative authority-for the United
States Supreme Court to declare a law unconstitutional on the avowed
ground that it conflicted with general principles of natural justice
3
unassociated with the written text.
Judges of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were not
so narrowly textualist. Indeed, the earliest state constitutions were
largely viewed as merely committing to writing ancient and inalienable
unwritten rights.4 A bill of rights was thought to be the renewed
declaration, not the creation, of fundamental law. Only half of the
states included a bill of rights at all, although there is no indication
that in those states lacking a bill of rights the citizenry ceded any
of the unwritten rights themselves. 5 One part of these early state
Donald Lutz for suggesting to me the niceties of these distinctions. For the purposes of this
Article, however, these categories need not be distinguished since the aim of this Article is to
contrast the written with unwritten sources of law. Thus, the Article will refer to "unwritten
law," "natural law," and "law of nature" interchangeably, and will group together cases and
judges who may, in fact, have been referring to quite different unwritten sources of law. Finally,
the essay will also use the term "natural rights" to refer to unwritten individual rights, although
there was also a subtle distinction between "natural rights" and "natural law." See 3-4 G.
EDWARD WHITE, supra note 1, at 676-77 (noting that the "natural rights" theory referred to
the creation of government "to protect the inalienable rights of man that existed anterior to
the formation of society," while the "natural law" theory referred to "abstract principles of
justice, humanity, tolerance, and 'civilized' living that were 'beyond dispute' in any culture
which considered itself enlightened").
:1It should be obvious from this discussion that by "textualist" I mean something far broader
than the most common jurisprudential meaning of one who focuses on the constitutional text
to the exclusion of such things as history or intention. See Marshall, Fighting the Words of
The Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342, 1343 n.9 (1989) (stating that "the textualist
adheres to the plain meaning of the Constitution's words to the extent that they are determinate");
Redish & Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and Judicial Review: The Role of Textual Analysis,
62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 17-22 (1987) (discussing the meaning and limits of textualism). I use the
term simply to indicate the tradition that judicial decisions must be anchored by the text, in
contrast to the extra-textualist tradition of ignoring the text.
4 See Sherry, supra note 1, at 1132-33 (noting that legislatures were "declaring rights already
in existence" in enacting "lists of fundamental rights and principles").
5 Seven of the original thirteen states enacted separate bills or declarations of rights. DEL.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (1776), reprinted in 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTIONS 197-99 (W. Swindler ed. 1973); MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND CONST.

(1776), reprinted in 4

SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS
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constitutions, however, was meant as innovative: the provisions creating the framework of government.
The dual nature of the early written constitutions-as mere declarations of an older tradition of fundamental law and as new social
compacts of government-was reflected in the fact that the seven
original states with any significant textual protection of rights explicitly separated their' constitutions into two distinct parts: a declaration of rights and a frame of government. 6 The first was derived,
often explicitly, from unwritten tradition; the second was a written
creation of the "new science of politics. ' ' 7
Between 1776 and 1787, state judiciaries carried into practical effect
this union of tradition and science. In seven cases during that period,
state judges reviewed state statutes for consistency with fundamental
law. Five statutes were invalidated,8 one was upheld, 9 and one was
given a questionable interpretation in order to avoid any conflict with
higher law. ° In only two of the cases did the judges rely exclusively
(W. Swindler ed. 1975); MASS. CONST. OF 1780, part the first, reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 92-96 (W. Swindler ed. 1975); N.H. CONST.
OF 1784, part I, reprinted in 6 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS
344-47 (W. Swindler, ed. 1976); N.C. CONST. OF 1776, Declaration of Rights, reprinted in 7
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 402-04 (W. Swindler ed. 1978);
PA. CONST. OF 1776, Declaration of Rights of the Inhabitants of the State of Pennsylvania,
reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 278-79 (W.
Swindler ed. 1979); VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (1776), reprinted in 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 48-50 (W. Swindler ed. 1979). By 1800, only eight
of sixteen states had them. Vermont was the only additional state. VT. CONST. OF 1777, ch. I,
reprinted in 9 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 489-90 (W.
Swindler ed. 1979).
6 See supra note 5 (noting the seven original states which included a declaration
of rights in
their original constitutions).
'The "new science of politics" refers to a scientific philosophy which recognized that the
government should serve as a check on the violence and passion of human nature to achieve
power while still stimulating the pursuit of passive self-interest. The theoretical result would
be the control of violent human nature while permitting society to accomplish constructive
private goals. See Schwartz, Book Review, 97 HARV. L. REV. 815, 828-34 (1983) (reviewing W.
NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 1830-1900 (1982)); see also Moynihan, The
"New Science of Politics" and the Old Art of Government, 1987 PUB. INTEREST 22 (discussing
the influence of the "new science of politics" on colonial and present government).
I Symsbury Case, 1 Kirby 444 (Conn. 1785); The Ten Pound Act Cases (N.H. 1786), described
in 2 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
969-71 (1953); Holmes v. Walton, described in Scott, Holmes v. Walton: The New Jersey
President, 4 AM. HIST. REV. 456, 456-60 (1899); Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 5 (1787);
Trevett v. Weedon (R.I. Super. Ct. 1786), described in J. VARNUM, THE CASE, TREVETT AGAINST
WEEDON: ON INFORMATION AND COMPLAINT, FOR REFUSING PAPER BILLS IN PAYMENT FOR
BUTCHER'S MEAT, IN MARKET, AT PAR WITH SPECIE (1787).

9Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782).
10Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. Mayor's Ct. 1784), reprinted in 1 J. GOEBEL, THE LAW
PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 317-419 (1964).
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on the written constitution." In the others, judges (and lawyers) relied
on both the written constitution and unwritten fundamental law,
citing such things as the "fundamental laws of England,"'' 2 the "law
of nations,"'' 3 Magna Carta, 4 "common right and reason,"' 5 "una'7
lienable rights,"' 6 and "natural justice." 1
Moreover, these cases exhibit a pattern. In cases involving individual
rights, the natural law component was usually dominant. In cases
involving the structure of the government, however, the written constitution was often more decisive. 8 The distinction between natural
law and textualism as methods of discovering fundamental law thus
followed the dichotomy between tradition and science.
After the establishment of the federal courts in 1789, those courts
continued the same tradition of measuring positive law against both
written and unwritten higher law. Early federal cases also exhibited
the same correlation between textualism and governmental powers,
as well as between natural law and individual rights. Even within a
single case, a judge might have relied on the written text to decide
a separation of powers question and on unwritten law to decide an
individual rights question.
" Bayard, 1 N.C. (Mart.) at 7 (ruling "[tihat by the constitution every citizen had undoubtedly
a right to a decision of his property by a trial by jury. . . . But that was clear, that no act
[the legislature] could pass, could by any means repeal or alter the constitution"); Caton, 8 Va.
(4 Call) at 8 (Wythe, J., relying on the state constitutional separation of powers provision in
order to "protect one branch of the legislative, and, consequently, the whole community, against
the usurpations of the other"); see also Sherry, supra note 1, at 1142-46 (discussing Bayard
and Caton).
12Trevett v. Weedon (R.I. Super. Ct. 1786), described in J. VARNUM, supra note 8, at 11, 15;
see also Sherry, supra note 1, at 1140 (discussing Trevett and the court's application of the
fundamental laws of England).
,1See Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. Mayor's Ct. 1784), reprinted in 1 J. GOEBEL, supra note
10, at 340-92 (briefs for defendant), 399-419 (opinion of the Mayor's Court); see also Trevett
v. Weedon (R.I. Super. Ct. 1786), described in J. VARNUM, supra note 8, at 23 (describing the
"general principles equally binding in all governments"); Sherry, supra note 1, at 1136-38
(discussing the use of the "laws of nations" in the opinion of the Rutgers court).
14 Trevett v. Weedon (R.I. Super. Ct. 1786), described in J. VARNUM, supra note 8, at 11,
15,
19; see also Sherry, supra note 1, at 1140 (discussing the Trevett court's use of Magna Carta).
,1 Trevett v. Weedon (R.I. Super. Ct. 1786), described in J. VARNUM, supra note 8, at 30; see
also Sherry, supra note 1, at 1141 (discussing the Trevett court's use of "common right and
reason").
" Trevett v. Weedon (R.I. Super. Ct. 1786), described in J. VARNUM, supra note 8, at 35; see
also Sherry, supra note 1, at 1141 (discussing the Trevett court's use of "unalienable rights" in
its decision).
17See Trevett v. Weedon (R.I. Super. Ct. 1786), described in J. VARNUM, supra note 8, at
29-31 (the court referring to "the laws of nature," "the laws of God," and "the laws of superior
nature"). In other cases, while not specifically referring to any unwritten law, there is a strong
suggestion that fundamental law served as a basis for the court's decisions. See Sherry, supra
note 1, at 1141-42 (discussing The Ten Pound Act Cases and the Symsbury Case).
"See Sherry, supra note 1.
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My purpose here is to continue the examination of the role of
unwritten fundamental law by looking at state cases after the establishment of the federal republic. In particular, I will focus on Virginia
during the last decade of the eighteenth century and the first three
decades of the nineteenth. Because of its longstanding and welldeveloped court system, its plethora of outstanding judges and lawyers, 19 and its systematic reporting of decisions of the state's highest
court, early Virginia offers a wealth of cases through which to investigate the role of unwritten law. Virginia, moreover, had one of
the earliest written constitutions, and because it included a substantial
bill of rights, it affords one of the best opportunities for measuring
the relative importance of written and unwritten law.
Two types of cases provide useful ground for testing the hypothesis
that Virginia judges 20 had recourse to unwritten as well as written
fundamental law. The question is raised directly in cases of judicial
review-cases in which the court was reviewing the validity of a
positive legislative enactment for its conformity with higher law. In
those cases, it is possible to ask whether the judges seemed to measure
the enactment against the written constitution (either exclusively or
in preference to unwritten law), or whether they seemed indifferent
regarding the written or unwritten character of the fundamental law.
The question of the influence of unwritten law is also raised,
somewhat less directly, when a court was asked to rule on a statutory
or common law dispute that implicated principles of natural law. In
early nineteenth-century Virginia, the quintessential example of such
a dispute was cases involving slavery. While few opinions directly
2
challenged the institution of slavery as a violation of natural law, '
any case in which a slave sought a legal declaration of freedomindeed, perhaps any case governed by the law of slavery-indirectly
required the judges to determine the status of the institution. A
judicial refusal to free the petitioning slave, and to some extent a
refusal to use the case as an opportunity to declare the whole insti19These included George Wythe, Spencer Roane, Edmund Pendleton and St. George Tucker
on the bench, as well as Edmund Randolph and John Marshall at the bar.
20All cases cited in this Article are from the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals (sometimes
referred to as the court of appeals) unless otherwise noted.
21 Probably the only case that did so was Chancellor Wythe's opinion in Hudgins v. Wrights,
11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134 (1806), which was disapproved by the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals. Wythe's opinion, which has not been preserved, apparently freed the petitioning slaves
on two alternative grounds: that they were not Negroes but Indians and thus were illegally
enslaved, and that "freedom is the birthright of every human being." Id. Although the supreme
court of appeals upheld Wythe's decree on the first ground, both appellate opinions explicitly
disapproved of the second ground. Id. at 140-41, 144.
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tution in violation of unwritten law, necessarily raises one of two
preliminary inferences: either the institution was not in violation of
unwritten fundamental law, or the judge failed, in that instance, to
invalidate positive law that conflicted with unwritten fundamental
law. Thus, an examination of the Virginia decisions on the law of
freedom provides further illumination of the role of unwritten law in
that state.
I turn first to extra-textual interpretation in cases of judicial review,
and then to the role of unwritten law in cases of slaves petitioning
for freedom.
II.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATUTES

In order to distinguish between textual and extra-textual interpretation, one must first know what the text says. The Virginia Constitution of 1776 was one of the earliest state constitutions; the
drafting process began prior to the Declaration of Independence. The
constitution was drafted and adopted by a specially constituted committee of selected members of the Virginia House of Burgesses (the
lower chamber of the legislature), without popular ratification. It
remained in effect until 1830.
The 1776 Constitution, like those of several other states, included
a long and detailed bill of rights that appeared primarily to be
memorializing unwritten rights rather than creating new ones.2 2 This
natural law heritage was reflected in the very first section of the bill
of rights, which began by declaring that "all men are by nature equally
free and independent, and have certain inherent rights. ' 23 Further
evidence of the natural law influence on the 1776 bill of rights is
found in the fact that some of its provisions seemed to reflect natural
law precepts rather than a concern with placing injunctive limits on
government. 24 For example, section 15 stated: "That no free government, or the blessings of liberty, can be preserved to any people, but
by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and
virtue, and by frequent recurrence to fundamental principles. ' ' 25 Although the Virginia courts did occasionally refer to the admonition
22 VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
23

(1776), supra note 5, at 48-50.

Id. § 1, at 49.

24 Robert Palmer has made a similar observation about the 1776 Pennsylvania Declaration of
Rights, noting that rights were "principles and not ... sovereign commands." Palmer, Liberties
as Constitutional Provisions: 1776-1791, in LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY: CONSTITUTION AND

RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 55, 65 (1987).
§ 15 (1776), supra note
25 VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

5, at 50.
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to recur to fundamental principles, 26 the remainder of section 15 did
not appear to be directed at any particular governmental action.
Language like this, scattered throughout the Virginia Bill of Rights,
suggests again that the authors were merely committing to writing
familiar ancient principles.
Some of the specific principles included in the Bill of Rights were
a guarantee of freedom of the press, 27 a right to a jury trial, 28 and
religious toleration. 29 For the purposes of this Article, it is important
to note that the Virginia Bill of Rights included neither a prohibition
against ex post facto laws nor a requirement of compensation when
private property is taken for public purposes. Nevertheless, Virginia
judges in the early days of the republic used unwritten or natural
law to protect against both ex post facto laws and uncompensated
takings. 30 Judges and lawyers also relied, generally, on unwritten
natural law principles as much as on the written text, and, on occasion,
explicitly preferred the unwritten principles.
Virginia courts had been reviewing the validity of statutes since at
least 1782, and perhaps earlier. 3' The reliance on natural law, however,
first became apparent in 1788. In that year, the Virginia legislature
passed an act directing sitting judges of the court of appeals to take
on new duties as district court judges. No additional compensation
was provided, and it was argued that additional duties without compensation was equivalent to a diminution in salary, and thus unconstitutional. Although no action was instituted, the court of appeals
e.g., Cases of the Judges of the Court of Appeals, 8 Va. (4 Call) 135, 143 (1788).
§ 12 (1776), supra note 5, at 50.
d. § 8, at 49.

26See,
27 VA.

28
2Id.

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

§ 16, at 50.

" See infra notes 31-101 and accompanying text.
11See Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782). There have been persistent rumors
of an earlier case, initially described by Thomas Jefferson in his reports of general court decisions
prior to independence. Robin v. Hardaway, (Va. 1772), reported in JEFFERSON'S REPORTS OF
CASES DETERMINED IN THE GENERAL COURT OF VIRGINIA 109, reprinted in Va. Rpts. Ann.
(Jefferson) 58 (1903) [hereinafter Va. Rpts. Ann. (Jefferson)]; see also R. COVER, JUSTICE
ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO

19 (1975); 1 JUDICIAL CASES

CONCERNING

91-92 (H. Catterall ed. 1926). No other record of this

case exists, and Jefferson's report may be inaccurate. Moreover, although the plaintiffs, according
to Jefferson, did contend that the statute at issue was void as "contrary to natural right,"
Jefferson's description suggests that the plaintiffs' primary argument was that the statute had
been repealed. See Robin v. Hardaway (1772), Va. Rpts. Ann. (Jefferson), supra, at 58, 60-62.
Later Virginia cases dealing with the same pair of statutes generally failed to cite Robin at all,
suggesting that Jefferson's report may have been inaccurate. See, e.g., Butt v. Rachel, 18 Va.
(4 Munf.) 209 (1813); Pallas v. Hill, 12 Va. (2 Hen. & M.) 149 (1807); Hudgins v. Wrights, 11
Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 133 (1806). The one case I am aware of that did cite Robin used it only
to support the proposition that the earlier statute tolerating Indian slavery had been repealed.
Gregory v. Baugh, 29 Va. (2 Leigh) 665, 681 (1831).
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nevertheless made its opinion known to the legislature. Four months
after the act was passed, the judges delivered to the legislature The
Respectful Remonstrance of the Court of Appeals.3 2 In it, they declared
an obligation to favor the written constitution over statutes inconsistent with it, and found the 1788 act to be inconsistent with the
text of the constitution. 33 Rather than invalidate the act, however,
they simply refused to execute it, and requested the legislature to
34
repeal it.
Despite the overt references to the written constitution, the Remonstrance seemed to base its conclusions on both written and unwritten law. The Remonstrance first set out the facts, and then framed
two questions: whether the 1788 act was unconstitutional and if so,
whether "it was their duty to declare that the act must yield to the
constitution.."35 The judges began their analysis by noting that in
"forming their judgment on both the questions, they had recourse to
that article in the declaration of rights, that no free government, or
the blessing of liberty can be preserved to any people but (among
''
other things) by frequent recurrence to fundamental principles. 36
In discussing "fundamental principles" and their relationship to
the constitution, the judges clearly relied on unwritten law. They
declared that "[t]he propriety and necessity of the independence of
the judges is evident in reason and the nature of their office," and
went on to explain that only an independent judiciary can mete out
impartial justice to the rich and the poor, as well as to the government
and the people.3 7 Thus the "fundamental principles" to which the
constitution directed recurrence were, in fact, the same principles of
reason and justice that animated natural law doctrines. Moreover,
although the Remonstrance later examined and relied upon specific
provisions of the written constitution, it first discussed "fundamental
principles," suggesting that the judges believed such principles to be
a primary basis by which they refused to execute the legislation.
One final aspect of the Remonstrance might confirm its natural
law basis. Immediately after concluding that an independent judiciary
is a fundamental principle, the judges considered "whether the people
have secured, or departed from [this principle], in the constitution,
or form of government. 3 8 Since the Remonstrance ultimately conCases
Id. at
3
'Id. at
Id. at
30
Id. at
7
1d. at
3
Id.
2

of the Judges of the Court of Appeals, 8 Va. (4 Call) 135, 140-47 (1788).
142.
146.
141-42.
142-43.
143.

HeinOnline -- 53 Alb. L. Rev. 304 1988-1989

1989]

Extra-Textual Interpretation

cluded that the constitution did in fact secure the independence of
the judiciary, we cannot know what the judges might have done had
they decided otherwise. However, the very asking of the question
tentatively suggests the possibility that the "fundamental principles"
adverted to in the bill of rights (which, remember, merely declared
ancient principles) were superior even to the written frame of government: it is quite possible that the judges were prepared to invalidate
or ignore any part of the written constitution that directly conflicted
with unwritten law.
Four years later, the Virginia court had before it an actual case
implicating the constitutionality of a statute. In Turner v. Turner's
Executor,39 the plaintiffs challenged the validity of a legislative enactment changing the law relating to gifts of slaves, alleging that it40
was an unconstitutional, ex post facto law. Although President
Edmund Pendleton ultimately upheld the law as being prospective
only, he did suggest that a retrospective law would be invalid-despite
the absence of any provision in the Virginia Constitution outlawing
41
ex post facto laws.

Pendleton noted that a law retrospectively affecting title to slaves
would be "subject to every objection which lies to ex post facto laws,
as it would destroy rights already acquired. ' ' 4 2 The power to make

such laws, he contended, was "oppressive and contrary to the principles of the constitution. ' ' 43 Since the constitution did not contain

any provision prohibiting retrospective laws, Pendleton's conclusion
must rest either directly on unwritten principles of natural justice or
on the integration of such principles into the "fundamental principles"
language of the written constitution. The inference of a direct reliance
upon natural law is perhaps stronger for two reasons. First, Pendleton
did not cite the "fundamental principles" provision in Turner, while
-198 Va. (4 Call) 234 (1792).
In Virginia, President was the equivalent of Chief Justice.
Turner v. Turner's Ex'r, 8 Va. (4 Call) 234, 237 (1792). There was some debate during
that time about the meaning of the term "ex post facto." Some thought it referred only to
retrospective criminal laws, and some believed that it encompassed retrospective civil laws as
well. Compare J. MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 625-26 (I.H. Scott ed. 1970)
(1840) (statement of Dickenson, Aug. 29, 1787) (stating that ex post facto laws only apply to
criminal cases) with id. at 727-28 (statement of Mason, Sept. 14, 1787) (stating that ex post
facto laws most likely encompassed both civil and criminal laws). See also Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. (3 DalI.) 386 (1798) (illustrating, in three separate opinions, the scope of the civil-criminal
debate regarding the correct definition and application of ex post facto); cf. Dash v. Van Kleek,
7 Johns. 477, 505 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811). That dispute, however, is irrelevant to the discussion
in the text; Virginia's written constitution contained no bar to any type of retrospective law.
42 Turner, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 237.
43 Id.
40

41 See
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in the Remonstrance, written only four years earlier (with Pendleton's
participation), the judges did take note of the "fundamental principles"
provision. Second, Pendleton's own opinion in an 1802 ex post facto
case directly
attributes the invalidity of retrospective laws to "natural
' '4 4

justice.

1

Although both the Remonstrance and Turner suggest that judges
might have relied on unwritten higher law in addition to the written
law, one 1793 case in the Virginia Court of Chancery provides intriguing evidence of the predominance of unwritten or natural law.
Chancellor George Wythe, an eminent Virginia jurist and the holder
of the first law chair in the United States, decided in Page v.
Pendleton45 that the Virginia legislature could not unilaterally discharge debts Virginians owed to British citizens. His decision was
based on the premise that a legislature could not bind one who was
not a member of the society, because the requisite consent was
46
lacking.
In the course of his opinion, Wythe wrote several long footnotes

explaining his holding. Two of these footnotes contain extensive
discussions of natural law principles. To support his holding that
"the right to money due to an enemy cannot be confiscated, '47 Wythe
explained in a footnote:
If this seem contrary to what is called authority, as perhaps it

may seem to some men, the publisher of the opinion will be against
the authority, when, in a question depending, like the present, on

the law of nature, the48 authority is against reason, which is affirmed

to be the case here.
He then proceeded to explain why the "authority" was contrary to
reason.

49

4 Elliott's Ex'r v. Lyell, 7 Va. (3 Call) 268 (1802); see infra text accompanying notes 62-77
(discussing Lyell).
45Page v. Pendleton (Va. 1793) reported in G. WYTHE, DECISIONS OF CASES IN VIRGINIA BY
THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY WITH REMARKS UPON DECREES BY THE COURT OF APPEALS

REVERSING SOME OF THESE DECISIONS 211 (1852), reprinted in Va. Rpts. Ann. (Wythe) 221

(1903).
46 Id. at 214-16, Va. Rpts. Ann. (Wythe) at 232-33.
7 Id. at 212, Va. Rpts. Ann. (Wythe) at 221.
"' Id. at 212 n.(b), Va. Rpts. Ann. (Wythe) at 221 n.(b).
11Id. Wythe analogized his belief in the impropriety of a legislative commission for privateering,
which many of his day felt to be justified, to the crime of piracy. Noting that both the Greeks
and Barbarians of ancient times viewed piracy as a noble venture, Wythe pointed to a change
in this philosophy over time, eventually leading to the conclusion that piracy was not noble at
all, but rather a crime against mankind. Inherent in this belief, apparently, was the natural
law philosophy that crimes against mankind exist whether or not a community believes they
do. Likewise, Wythe felt that punishing members of an entire community by endorsing nonpayment of the private debt owed to certain citizens "when, without their knowledge, some of
their fellow-citizens or fellow-subjects act unjustly," violated an unannounced principle of law,
despite the legislative condonation of such action.
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Later, in considering the question of who might be bound by what
laws, Wythe dropped an even more interesting footnote. He stated:
The position in the sixth article of our bill of rights, namely, that
men are not bound by laws to which they have not, by themselves,
or by representatives of their election, assented, is not true of
unwritten or common law, that is, of the law of nature, called
common law, because it is common to all mankind. . . . They are
laws which men, who did not ordain them, have not power to
abrogate. °
He then went on to explain how the disenfranchised, and subsequent
generations, could nevertheless be held to have consented to the
passage of positive laws in which they actually played no part.5 1 It
is clear from these footnotes that Wythe believed that fundamental
law included natural, unwritten law, although his ruling did not in
fact depend on much unwritten law. Nor is it important that Wythe
was sitting in equity rather than in law, since his dicta were apparently
meant more as treatise comments on law in general than as direct
authority in the case before him.
In 1797, an enterprising plaintiff's counsel acted upon Judge Pendleton's earlier suggestion that ex post facto laws were void, and
added the idea that governmental taking of property required compensation. His arguments were to no avail: the court in Carter v.
Tyler 52 upheld a statute that converted all entailed estates into fee
simple estates, thus depriving the remaindermen of previously acquired
contingent rights. Counsel for the plaintiff primarily argued that the
statute should not be construed to dock entails in existence prior to
the passage of the act. He also contended, however, although without
much elaboration, that any other interpretation would render the act
"unconstitutional and void; because it would be ex post facto in its
operation, taking away private rights without any public necessity,
and without making the injured parties any compensation for them."5 3
No authority was given for this proposition, nor could any textual
- Id. at 214 n.(e), Va. Rpts. Ann. (Wythe) at 222 n.(e).
51Id., Va. Rpts. Ann. (Wythe) at 222-23 n.(e). Wythe's analysis initially confronts the problem
of law binding those who have not directly consented to it by declaring society necessary to
the continued existence of humanity, for "[w]ithout society, mankind . . .would be wretched."
Id. Thus, since society is a necessary condition to survival, those within society must conform
to some basic institutions and obligations necessary to make a group of individuals into a
community. Society's structure is, in turn, provided by natural law, which is not formally
consented to, but rather "devolves" upon humanity. Id. Therefore, individuals by their very
formation of a society necessarily "consent" to being governed by certain principles which, if
society is to continue, must be binding upon subsequent generations.
525 Va. (1 Call) 165 (1797).
5Id. at 172.
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support be provided. As noted, the Virginia Bill of Rights contained
54
neither an ex post facto clause nor a just compensation clause.
Judge Pendleton construed the statute as operating retrospectively,
but failed to discuss its constitutionality. This omission is especially
puzzling in light of Pendleton's remark during argument that "the
defendant's counsel are desired to confine themselves to the question,
whether the act is void, as being unconstitutional."' 5 5 Despite being
enjoined to do so by the President, defendant's counsel apparently
did not address the question and Pendleton never returned to it.
Carter, therefore, affords some support for the notion that lawyers
used natural law principles in arguing cases, but provides no evidence
at all on how courts received such arguments. In the early nineteenth
century, however, and thus at least arguably in 1797, "arguments of
counsel were regarded as themselves sources of law."5 6 Thus counsel's
reliance on natural law, in Carter, provides some evidence that unwritten principles of natural law-whether or not incorporated into
the written constitution-were considered dispositive.
Two cases involving fines show that the early Virginia courts
subscribed to the related idea that natural rights and written rights
were at least coterminous. In Jones v. Commonwealth,57 a 1799 case,
the court overturned the imposition of joint fines on several defendants. Judge Spencer Roane noted that the principle against joint
fines was "fortified not only by the principles of natural justice, . . .
but, also, by the clause of the Bill of Rights, prohibiting excessive
fines."5 8 Judge Paul Carrington held that the fines were invalid,
"whether I consider the case upon principle, the doctrines of the
common law, or the spirit of the Bill of Rights." 59 Judge Pendleton
dissented, distinguishing the common law cases without mentioning
the written constitution. However, two years later, in Bullock v.
Goodall,6 0 Pendleton revealed his sympathy with his brethren's equivalence of the written and unwritten law. In overturning a fine, he
wrote that it was "superlatively excessive, unconstitutional, oppressive,
6' 1
and against conscience.
In 1802, the court revisited the question of retrospective statutes
and unwritten law. Elliott's Executor v. LyellJ6 2 involved a 1786 statute
51See supra text accompanying note 30.

5 Carter, 5 Va. (1 Call) at 174.
663-4 G. EDWARD WHITE, supra note 1, at 291.
575 Va. (1 Call) 555 (1799).
11Id. at 556.
11Id. at 559.
7 Va. (3 Call) 44 (1801).
11Id. at 50.
62 7 Va. (3 Call) 268 (1802).
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that changed the law of obligations as it related to joint obligors.
The question before the court was whether the statute applied to a
contract entered into prior to the enactment of the statute. The court
ultimately concluded that the statute could not be read to apply to
the contract at issue. However, several of the judges reached that
conclusion at least partly on the basis of their views about unwritten
fundamental law.
Counsel for the appellant argued that a careful reading of the
statute showed that the legislature had not intended the statute to
apply to existing contracts. 63 He also contended that "perhaps" the
legislature could not give the statute retrospective effect, because it
would then be acting in a judicial capacity by interpreting rather
than making law. 64 This mingling of legislative and judicial functions
would, he contended, violate the constitutional guarantee that the
branches of government be kept distinct. 6 This oblique suggestion
was the only argument the appellant made to suggest the invalidity
of the statute; he relied primarily on the statutory construction
arguments. It is not even clear whether counsel meant that the statute
should be construed to make it constitutional, that the legislature
could not have intended to enact an unconstitutional statute, or that
the statute as enacted was unconstitutional. The statutory question
was clearly thought to be of more significance than the constitutional
one.
Only Judge Roane followed counsel's lead and confined himself to
statutory interpretation. Roane noted that "[t]he question here, is
not, whether the Legislature have power to pass a retrospective law"
but rather whether they had done So. 6 6 Roane concluded that the
statute could not be read to have retrospective effect. 67 The other
three judges agreed with his conclusion, but each indicated that the
statutory interpretation was compelled by the fundamental principle
against retrospective laws.
Judge William Fleming held that the legislature could not be
presumed to intend retrospective effect, because "retrospective laws
[are] odious in their nature. 6 8 Construing the statute retrospectively,
moreover, would be "contrary to the general system of an enlightened
I See

id. at 271.
"See id. at 274. Chancellor Kent of New York relied on the same argument a few years
later to deny the validity of a retrospective law in Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 508 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1811) (stating that "the power that makes is not the power to construe a law").
'5Lyell, 7 Va. (3 Call) at 274.
"Id. at 277.
6 Id. at 280-81.
"Id. at 282.
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jurisprudence. ' 69 Judge Peter Lyons similarly concluded that the legislature "ought not to be presumed to have willed injustice." ° He
characterized retrospective laws as "unjust and improper" and "necessarily oppressive," and noted that construing the law as retrospective
in operation "would destroy the principles of natural justice. ' ' 71 Both
Fleming and Lyons thus avoided actually holding the law invalid, but
did so under the canon that statutes should be construed so as to
avoid doubts about their constitutionality. Although these opinions
do not demonstrate that either judge would have invalidated the
statute if they could not construe it consistently with natural justice,
they do suggest the strong relationship between unwritten law and
judicial review.
Judge Pendleton, who had been hinting since 1782 that judges
might strike down unconstitutional laws, 72 and who would write an
opinion invalidating a state statute only a year after Lyell, 73 took a
rather disingenuous approach. He first declared that retrospective
laws were "against the principles of natural justice" 74 and then deliberately avoided the consequences of that conclusion. Fleming and
Lyons relied on natural law to guide their interpretation of the statute,
thus suggesting that fundamental law-written or unwritten-does
serve as a constraint on the legislature. After concluding that retrospective laws were invalid, however, Pendleton merely stated that
he was "not obliged to give an opinion" on whether the judiciary
might void an invalid act. 75 He then proceeded to interpret the statute
as Fleming and Lyons had, but made his interpretation appear entirely
unconstrained by any external principles. 7 6 Thus, Pendleton again
warmed his readers to the idea of judicial review, he virtually announced that he would invalidate a retrospective law, and he made
it appear as if his interpretation of the statute as prospective was
forced only by the words of the statute itself-thereby proclaiming
his intentions without having to act on them, unlike Lyons and
Fleming. Nevertheless, Pendleton's beliefs are clear: retrospective
r9Id.
7

0Id.at 284.
11Id. at 283.
72See Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 17-18 (1782).
71Pendleton wrote an opinion in Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call) 113 (1804), invalidating
a Virginia statute requiring the sale of church lands, id. at 187, but he died the day before it
was to be delivered. See 2 J. MAYS, EDMUND PENDLETON, 1721-1803: A BIOGRAPHY 345 (1952);
see also infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
7'Lyell, 7 Va. (3 Call) at 285.
71Id. at 286.
76 See id. at 286-88 (reasoning that the words of the statute indicated no intent on the part
of the legislature to pass a retrospective act).
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statutes are against natural justice and thus invalid. Pendleton further
confirmed his adherence to the natural law tradition of his time by
explaining the relevance of the contract clause of the federal Constitution: "although that [clause] is subsequent to the present act, I
consider it as declaring a principle which always existed. ' ' 77
Pendleton's fidelity to unwritten law as a significant source of
higher law, enforceable by the court, was apparently carried on by
his immediate successor, St. George Tucker (although to somewhat
different effect). Turpin v. Locket 78 was argued in 1803, and the
decision was to be announced on October 26 of that year. Had events
not intervened, the court would have held three to one that a Virginia
statute confiscating church glebe lands was unconstitutional. Judge
Pendleton had already written an opinion invalidating the law, and
Judges Carrington and Lyons agreed with him.7 9 Judge Pendleton,
however, died the night before he was to deliver his opinion, 80 and
Judge Tucker was appointed to replace him. The case was reargued,
and in 1804 Tucker's support of the law led to a tie vote, thus
affirming Chancellor Wythe's refusal to enjoin the confiscation.
Judge Roane found that the church had no vested right in the
property and voted to affirm.81 Judges Carrington and Lyons, in a
brief joint opinion, found the confiscation law unconstitutional without
much elaboration.8 2 Judge Tucker, whose vote changed the final outcome, delivered a detailed opinion examining the church's rights in
the property. He found both that the church lacked any vested right
in the property, and that earlier statutes awarding church ministers
the monies from glebe lands probably violated various specific sections
83
of the written bill of rights.

Tucker also noted, however, that any incumbent ministers (whom
he later held did not exist) had acquired "a legal right" and also "a
moral right" to the enjoyment of their estates.8 4 He wrote: "So far
7

Id. at 285.
1810 Va. (6 Call) 113 (1804).
19See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
80See supra note 73.
" Turpin, 10 Va. (6 Call) at 158.
12 Id. at 186.
- Tucker held that a grant of state monies to a specific denomination violated section 4 of
the Virginia Bill of Rights, which provided: "That no man, or set of men, are entitled to
exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of
public service .... " VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 4 (1776), supra note 5, at 49. According
to Tucker, after the Revolution "the promulgation of the religious doctrines of any religious
sect ceased to be a common benefit to the community" and thus ministers were not entitled
to community payment. Turpin, 10 Va. (6 Call) at 152.
Turpin, 10 Va. (6 Call) at 152.
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as any act of the legislature has operated for [the] purpose [of
protecting those rights], it may be considered as pursuing the injunctions of moral justice, and of the first article of our bill of rights. ' 8
This was not, however, an isolated reference to moral rights. Earlier
in his opinion, Judge Tucker set out the procedure for dealing with
conflicting state statutes: "If they cannot be reconciled to each other,
it will be our duty to pronounce those to be valid, which are most
easily reconcilable to the dictates of moral justice, and the principles
of the constitution of this commonwealth. '86 Thus Judge Tucker
thrice coupled morality with positive law, suggesting either that moral
rights were an additional source of fundamental law, or that the
constitution necessarily reflected moral justice. Despite an apparent
setback in the protection of what Pendleton might have considered
natural rights, some judges continued to adhere to the doctrine of
natural rights.
Indeed, the most suggestive endorsement of unwritten law is an
1809 retrospectivity case, Currie'sAdministrators v. Mutual Assurance
Society.17 The legislature had incorporated an insurance company in
1794, and then had changed the charter in 1805. Plaintiff was an
insured whose risk had risen as a result of the later act, and he
challenged it as unconstitutionally retrospective. The court upheld
the 1805 statute: Judge Roane found that the act worked no injustice,88
and Judge Fleming-in an opinion largely irrelevant to our concernsheld that the original act reserved the right to change the charter. 89
Judge Roane, however, also delivered a stinging refutation of the
defendant's attempt to limit the court to a textualist analysis.
John Wickham, 90 counsel for the defendant, had argued that laws
may be unjust, but still valid: "No doubt every government ought to
keep in view the great principles of justice and moral right, but no
authority is expressly given to the judiciary by the Constitution of
Virginia, to declare a law void as being morally wrong or in violation
I/d.
87

Id. at 150.
14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 315 (1809).

"See id. at 349-50.
8Id.
at 355-56.
90John Wickham was a prominent Virginia lawyer who often collaborated with Edmund
Randolph. In addition to the case in the text, Wickham and Randolph were co-counsel for the
church parties in Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call) 113 (1804), discussed supra at notes 7886, and represented the slave owners in Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319 (1800),
discussed infra at notes 165-67. Their most famous collaborative effort was defending Aaron
Burr. See D. MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM, 1805-1809, at 296, 310-11
(1974); J. REARDON, EDMUND RANDOLPH: A BIOGRAPHY 350-52, 357-58 (1974); C. WARREN,
A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 267-68 (1911).
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of a contract."91
Judge Roane vehemently rejected that limit on the court's authority.
He wrote that the legislature's authority is limited "by the constitutions of the general and state governments; and limited also by
considerations of justice. ' 92 He then directly denied the defendant's
textualist assumption:
It was argued by a respectable member of the bar, that the
legislature had a right to pass any law, however just, or unjust,
reasonable, or unreasonable. This is a position which even the
courtly Judge Blackstone was scarcely hardy enough to contend
for, under the doctrine of the boasted omnipotence of parliament.
What is this, but to lay prostrate, at the footstool of the legislature,
all our rights of person and of property, and abandon those great
objects, for the protection of which, alone, all free governments
93
have been instituted?
Although he ultimately concluded that the statute did not deprive
the plaintiff of any vested rights, Roane's outrage at the suggestion
that he was confined to a textualist analysis is palpable.
If the previously noted Remonstrance94 suggests that the Virginia
court was influenced by natural law as early as 1788, Crenshaw v.
Slate River Co.95 demonstrates that the influence was still strong forty
years later. Plaintiffs, who claimed river rights under a 1726 state
grant, challenged an 1819 law requiring them to build and maintain
locks to make the river navigable. The court unanimously held that
the plaintiffs held vested rights in their property, and that they could
not be deprived of those rights without compensation.
Recall that the Virginia Constitution of 1776, which was still in
effect in 1828, contained no just compensation clause, and in fact
provided only that persons could not be "deprived of their property
for public uses, without their own consent, or that of their representatives so elected. ' ' 96 Since the 1819 act was duly passed by the
Virginia legislature, that clause was of no avail. Judge Green, with
little elaboration, relied instead on section 1 of the 1776 Bill of Rights,
which protected the rights of "possessing property" and "enjoying
liberty. '97 The other judges apparently relied on unwritten law.
Judge Carr stated that the principle of compensation was "laid
,Currie's Adm'r, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) at 341.

"Id. at 346.
93 Id. at 346-47.
94 See

supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text (discussing the Remonstrance).
"527 Va. (6 Rand.) 245 (1828).
96 VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 6 (1776), supra note 5, at 49.
97 Crenshaw, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) at 276.
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down by the writers on Natural Law, Civil Law, Common Law, and
the Law of every civilized country."98 Although he never discussed
the written constitution, he concluded that "whether we judge this
Law by the principles of all Civilized Governments, by the Federal
Constitution, or that of our own State, it is unconstitutional and
void." 99 Judge Coalter held that compensation was required without
citing any written or unwritten authority.100 Judge Cabell simply stated
that he concurred with all the other judges.' 0

In two cases during this period the Virginia court referred to natural
law principles governing emigration. In both cases the emigration
question was peripheral, but the court's language was nonetheless
consistent with the unwritten rights analysis in the cases discussed
so far. In 1811, the court in Murray v. M'Carty0 2 held, following
Grotius, that emigration "is one of those 'inherent rights, of which,
when [persons] enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any
compact, deprive, or devest their posterity.' "o103 The court expanded
on this principle in 1829, noting that when a citizen of one state
moves to another and subjects himself to the latter's laws, he becomes
a citizen of the latter "upon the principles of natural law, and the
spirit of our institutions.'

0 4

As in both the federal cases and the pre-1787 state cases, the
Virginia courts did not depend entirely on unwritten natural law. In
1793, the court in Kamper v. Hawkins05 relied exclusively on the
written constitution to invalidate a statute giving district court judges
equitable jurisdiction and powers. All five judges held that the district
judges had not been properly appointed to the chancery court as
required by the constitution, and thus that they could not constitutionally exercise equitable jurisdiction. All of the opinions are conspicuously textualist.
Several judges minutely examined the portion of the written constitution setting out the frame of government. Judge Nelson and
Judge Tyler discussed judicial review in terms making clear that they
envisioned the written constitution as the fundamental law animating
judicial review of statutes.10 6 Judge Roane defined fundamental prin91Id. at 265.
9Id.
1
Id. at 283.

0o

101Id.

at 284.

16 Va. (2 Munf.) 393 (1811).
1"I Id. at 397; see also id. at 405 (Judge Roane stating that the right of emigration is "of
102

paramount authority, bestowed on us by the God of Nature").
10 Hunter v. Fulcher, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 172, 181 (1829).
1o3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20 (1793).
"

See id. at 31-34, 59-60.
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ciples as:
those great principles growing out of the Constitution, by the aid
of which, in dubious cases, the Constitution may be explained and
preserved inviolate; those land-marks, which it may be necessary
to resort to, on account of the impossibility to foresee or provide
for cases within the spirit, but without the letter of the Consti07
tution.1
Judge Tucker distinguished pre-revolutionary America from Virginia
under its written constitution. In the former, "[w]hat the constitution
of any country was or rather was supposed to be, could only be
collected from what the government had at any time done.' 10 8 In
these more enlightened times, however, "the constitution is not an
'ideal thing, but a real existence: it can be produced in a visible form:'
its principles can be ascertained from the living letter, not from
obscure reasoning or deductions only."' 0 9
Kamper, like the Virginia case of Commonwealth v. Caton"0 eleven
years earlier, raised a pure structure of government question."' Individual rights were not at stake. As in Caton, the judges in Kamper
were surely aware of this: except for two offhand references to the
bill of rights, the only part of the written constitution on which the
judges relied was the structural portion, denominated "the constitution
or form of government.""' 2 Unwritten law might define natural rights,
but the particular form of government depended primarily or exclu3
sively on the written constitution."
The pattern in early republican Virginia is thus similar to the
pattern in the pre-1787 state cases and in the federal cases at least
through the 1820s."14 Except for some clear governmental powers
decisions, judges and lawyers resorted to unwritten law as well as to
the written constitution. This provides some confirmation that unwritten law-including principles of natural justice-constituted an
107

Id. at 40.

,08
Id. at 78.
109Id.

Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782).
"IFor a discussion of the use of the written constitution primarily to resolve structure of
government questions, see Sherry, supra note 1, at 1143-45, 1169, 1173-74.
1108

.. VA. CONST. OF 1776, reprinted in 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS
CONSTITUTIONS 51-56 (W. Swindler ed. 1979).

OF UNITED STATES

' See also Case of the County Levy, 9 Va. (5 Call) 139 (date unknown). In Levy, Judge
Pendleton interpreted the written text to allow courts as well as legislatures to assess levies to
support courthouses, prisons and the like.
,,4
It is also similar to the pattern between 1789 and 1830 in several other states, including
New York, Massachusetts, and South Carolina. See Sherry, Courts of Justice and Courts of Law
(forthcoming).
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important source of the fundamental law by which positive enactments
might be measured.

III.

SLAVERY

During this same period, however, the Virginia courts failed to use
principles of natural justice to condemn what might be considered
the most flagrant violation of natural rights, the enslavement of the
black race. This failure seems inconsistent with the strong natural
law reasoning invoked by the court in the cases previously discussed.
Indeed, many citizens of the early republic-including such Virginia
judges as George Wythe, St. George Tucker and Spencer Roanewere personally convinced that slavery violated principles of natural
justice."l 5 A number of northern states, whose constitutions contained
language much like Virginia's to the effect that "all men are by nature
equally free and independent," construed that language to prohibit
slavery. 116 Abolitionists, especially in the decade preceding the Civil
I7
War, stressed the antipathy between the law of nature and slavery."
Why then did the Virginia judges fail to enforce unwritten natural
law where it might do the most good? Several scholars have suggested
one plausible explanation: that the values of natural law and the
values of positive law-or results produced by the application of the
'1 See I. BROWN, AMERICAN ARISTEDES: A BIOGRAPHY OF GEORGE WYTHE 266-67 (1981)
(discussing Wythe's abhorrence of slavery); R. COVER, supra note 31, at 205-06 (discussing
Tucker's and Roane's antislavery sentiments); 3-4 G. EDWARD WHITE, supra note 1, at 683
(reprinting Tucker's note, "On the State of Slavery in Virginia," in which Tucker stated that
slavery was the abolishment of both "personal liberty" and the "right to private property");

Nash, Reason of Slavery: Understanding the Judicial Role in the Peculiar Institution, 32 VAND.

L. REV. 7, 127-28 (1979) (discussing Tucker's belief that "[mianumission [had] a 'benevolent
design' ").

, Vermont did so explicitly in its 1777 Constitution, immediately following the general
language of natural equality. VT. CONST. OF 1777, ch. 1, § 1, supra note 5, at 489. Massachusetts
did so through judicial construction of the general language articulated in the "free and equal
clause" of the state constitution. See P. FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION:
ERALISM, AND COMITY 41 (1981); W. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY

SLAVERY,

FED-

CONSTITUTION-

1760-1848, at 45-48 (1977). With the Massachusetts example, contrast
Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 447, 449 (1824) (stating that "there is nothing
in the Constitution or Bill of Rights, repugnant to the power which the Legislature has exercised
in the punishment of [being condemned or resold as a slave for a grand larceny offense]").
117See R. COVER, supra note 31, at 154-58; D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE
ALISM IN AMERICA,

(1990); W. WIECEK, supra note 116, at 249-60; Nelson, The Impact
of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America,
87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 528-38 (1974).
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
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latter values-tugged southern judges in opposite directions.l 18 This
thesis rests on the theory that written enactments were held superior
to unwritten fundamental law; a theory that is undermined-at least
outside the context of slavery-by many of the cases discussed in
the previous section.
In fact, however, many of the slave cases in early Virginia reflect
an even deeper conflict than that between natural and positive law:
a conflict between two unwritten natural rights-the right to liberty
and the right to property. In particular, suits by slaves seeking their
freedom often tended to put judges in the untenable position of
divesting one party of a supposedly "inalienable" right.
An examination of several dozen cases ' 9 in which slaves petitioned
the courts for freedom confirms that the Virginia courts did view the
question more as a conflict between natural rights than as a conflict
between natural law and positive law. This conflict is reflected in the
cases in two ways. First, the result in many of the cases turned on
whether the party opposing freedom had what was recognized as an
unforfeited vested property right in the slave. While each case might
20
have superficially depended on a particular and isolated rule of law,'
"18Different

scholars describe the attraction of the positive law in different ways, but all share
the idea that natural rights could be "trumped" by some other value. Cover describes judges
as torn between the substantive antislavery value and "fidelity to the formal system." R. COVER,
supra note 31, at 197. Finkelman concludes that judges were committed to "preserving the
integrity of the law." P. FINKELMAN, supra note 116, at 182. Nash explains that the Virginia
court in particular was caught between "procedural self-restraint and pro-freedom results." Nash,
supra note 115, at 158; cf. 3-4 G. EDWARD WHITE, supra note 1, at 674-703 (making a similar
argument about Supreme Court treatment of natural law, positive law, and slavery). For Virginia
cases making explicit the conflict between natural rights and proslavery positive law, see
Commonwealth v. Turner, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 678 (1827); Butt v. Rachel, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 209,
212-13 (1813) (argument of counsel).
These theories illustrate the modern tendency to draw what Morton Horwitz has identified
as a "stark jurisprudential dichotomy between natural law and positive law." Horwitz, History
and Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1825, 1834 (1987). Indeed, Cover has gone even further and suggested
that at least where positive law governing procedure is at issue, it ought to triumph over
remedying even the most blatant violations of natural rights. See Cover, For James Wm. Moore:
Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 722-23 (1975).
"I I have tried to locate and examine every published case between 1787 and 1831 in which
the Virginia Supreme Court ruled on a slave's petition for freedom. I am sure that I have
missed a few, but I believe the cases discussed in the text are a representative sample, if not
the majority, of the cases actually decided.
120Some of the rules involved were statutory, and some were common law. In all the cases,
however, the rule was either ambiguous or commonly interpreted in a way that would have
defeated the slave's claim. Occasionally, judges explicitly refused to apply a general rule of law
in slave cases if it would defeat the slave's claim to freedom. For example, Judge Carrington
held that the rule against perpetuities was specifically inapplicable to testamentary provisions
conferring freedom on slaves. Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319, 347 (1800); accord
Peggy v. Legg, 20 Va. (6 Munf.) 229 (1818). More often, however, the court simply interpreted
an ambiguous rule; my contention is that in doing so, they were influenced by the conflict
between two natural rights.
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or peculiarity of facts, taken together the cases suggest a strong
pattern: the courts granted petitions for freedom unless doing so
would deprive an innocent property owner of vested rights. Second,
the language in many of the cases reflected the judges' dilemma when
faced with an inherent conflict between two principles of natural
justice. I will deal first with the pattern of decisions, and then with
the language of individual cases.
A.

Pattern of Decisions

One common question involved testamentary manumissions. Despite technical and substantive problems with many of the attempted
manumissions (some of which were illegal when the will was written
or when the testator died), the courts generally upheld such manu121
missions where no creditors or third-party purchasers were involved.
Moreover, where creditors were involved, the court tried to avoid
a conflict between their rights and the rights of the slaves. In Patty
v. Colin, 22 the manumitting testator died in debt, and his creditors
sought to satisfy their claims by taking the slaves. Even there, the
court directed that the slaves be used to satisfy the claims only as
a "last resort, and after every possible source of redemption should
be found to have failed."'' 23 The court ordered that the testator's lands
be sold and the proceeds applied to the debt; if the debt was satisfied,
the slaves were to go free. If the sale yielded an insufficient amount,
then the slaves were to be "sold for such term of years as may be
sufficient to raise the adequate fund.' ' 24 Only if that too proved
25
insufficient would the slaves' petition for freedom be denied.
Thus heirs, who had no vested property right in the decedent's
estate, were distinguished from creditors or purchasers, who did.
Where the testamentary manumission was opposed by an heir, no
conflict between natural rights arose, and the petition for freedom
121 See, e.g., Isaac v. West's Ex'r, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 652 (1828); Spotts v. Gillaspie, 27 Va. (6
Rand.) 566 (1828); President & Professors of William & Mary College v. Hodgson, 20 Va. (6
Munf.) 163 (1818); Charles v. Hunnicutt, 9 Va. (5 Call) 311 (1804); Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6
Va. (2 Call) 319 (1800); cf. Talbert v. Jenny, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 159 (1828) (manumission by
deed upheld against the manumittor's son, who claimed under an earlier deed).
122 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 519 (1807).
123 Id. at 529 (Roane, J., concurring).
124 Id. at 528 (Tucker, J., writing for a unanimous court).
125 Id.; accord Dunn v. Amey, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 465, 472 (1829) ("the right to emancipate

slaves is subordinate to the obligation to pay debts previously contracted"); Woodley v. Abby,
9 Va. (5 Call) 336, 342 (1805) (Judge Tucker ruling that emancipated slaves were subject to
the debts made by their owner prior to the will granting emancipation).
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was granted. Where creditors could be satisfied with nonslave property,
again a conflict was avoided and the petition was granted. At least
one judge even held that creditors who slept on their rights to slaves
had forfeited those rights, and again no conflict existed. 26 In general,
at least until the 1830s, only when the conflict between a manumitted
slave's right to liberty and an innocent creditor's vested right to
property was unavoidable did the courts deny a petition based on
27
testamentary manumission.'

An analogous pattern is evidenced in cases in which a slave who
claimed manumission by deed was opposed by a person who claimed
ownership of the slave by deed or sale. In Ben v. Peete,'28 for example,
the defendant claimed ownership by virtue of a bill of sale which
pre-dated the deed of manumission. Because there was insufficient
evidence to support the claim of a prior sale, the court did not need
to reach the harder question of conflicting natural rights. Ben gained
his freedom because Peete could not produce an authenticated bill
of sale to prove prior ownership.

29

In Kitty v. Fitzhugh,'30 by contrast,

there was evidence of an attempt by Kitty's original master to commit
fraud upon his divorced wife, through whom the defendant claimed.
The court thus held the original master's attempt at emancipationwhich occurred some ten years after his ex-wife should have come
into possession of the slave-ineffective, in a suit itself brought ten
years after the purported emancipation.13 ' Similarly, in Moses v.
Denigree, 32 the deed of emancipation under which the slave claimed
freedom specified that the slave would become free only fifteen years
126
127

See Woodley, 9 Va. (5 Call) at 349 (Carrington, J., dissenting).
In several fairly late cases, the court refused to implement a testamentary manumission

even in the absence of creditors. See Winn v. Bob, 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 140 (1831); Rucker's Adm'r
v. Gilbert, 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 8 (1831); Walthall's Ex'r v. Robertson, 29 Va. (2 Leigh) 189 (1830);
Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228 (1824). Several scholars have noted that by the early
1830s the courts were becoming less willing to uphold slaves' right to freedom, and these cases
may exemplify that trend. See, e.g., R. COVER, supra note 31, at 74-75; P. FINKLEMAN, supra
note 116, at 181-82; see also Gregory v. Baugh, 29 Va. (2 Leigh) 665, 680 (1831) (ruling against
the slave and commenting that "all who have examined the earlier cases in our books, must
admit, that our judges (from the purest motives, I am sure) did, in favorem libertatis, sometimes
relax, rather too much, the rules of law").
However, in both Maria and Rucker's Administrator, the testator's intentions were quite
unclear; it is possible to read both wills as not being intended to free the petitioning slaves.
In Walthall's Executor, Judge Carr dissented, and Judge Cabell-who had often voted in favor
of freedom-was absent. Thus, these few cases do not significantly undermine the thesis in the
text.
128

23 Va. (2 Rand.) 539 (1824).

,29Id. at 547-48.
13025 Va. (4 Rand.) 600 (1827).
"I,Id. at 609-10.
,3227 Va. (6 Rand.) 561 (1828).
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later. In the meantime, the manumittor died, and his daughter inherited the slave. Shortly after he should have been freed, he was
sold to a stranger. He brought suit some twenty years later, and the
court denied his petition for freedom.1 33 As in the cases involving
testamentary manumissions, these cases suggest that the court tried
to avoid a conflict between the slaves' right to liberty and third-party
rights of property, ruling in favor of the latter only when a conflict
was unavoidable.
One case raised an intriguing variation of this situation. In Thrift
v. Hannah,34 the party opposing the petition for freedom was the
husband of the manumittor. Before she married, Hannah's owner
executed an in futuro deed of manumission. The deed was not proved
or recorded, and the husband was unaware of it. Hannah stayed with
her mistress past the date she should have been emancipated, and
sued for freedom only after her mistress' death. If one views the
rights acquired by the husband upon his marriage as intermediate
between the paramount rights of a creditor and the nonvested rights
of an heir, this case raises a difficult question. Indeed, the court split
three to two against the petition for freedom.
The various opinions indicate that the judges were aware of the
peculiar character of a husband's property rights, and that their views
on his rights were intertwined with their views on Hannah's petition.
Judge Green would have upheld Hannah's claim to freedom, and his
opinion provides the strongest evidence of such a linkage:
[Allowing Hannah and others like her to sue for freedom so late]
could prejudice no stranger to the transaction, if it was not allowed
to extend (as I think it ought not) to affect the creditors of or
133

The court relied on the invalidity of the emancipation deed under positive law. Id. at 564.

The overall pattern of the cases, however, suggests that the court was influenced by the presence
of an innocent third party. See supra note 121; see also Peggy v. Legg, 20 Va. (6 Munf.) 229
(1818) (petition denied where the slave who was conditionally manumitted by will had already
been sold by the heir to a third party); Givens v. Manns, 20 Va. (6 Munf.) 191 (1818) (the
facts being unclear, it appears that slaves who claimed manumission by their former master,
made subsequent to the purchase by another, were not freed when at the time of the suit they
were held by an apparently uninvolved third master). One case appears to break this pattern.
In Whiting v. Daniel, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 390 (1807), the testator's nephew (Whiting) claimed
that his aunt had deeded him the slaves several years before she wrote a will emancipating
them. No other parties were involved. The court nevertheless upheld Whiting's claim to the
slaves in a brief and uninformative opinion. Whiting's counsel, however, suggested that Whiting
had sustained considerable hardship in acquiring the slaves, perhaps in order to make him look
more like an innocent creditor. Whiting had agreed to support and take care of his aunt in
her waning years. Counsel stressed both that the aunt had given him the slaves for this valuable
consideration, and that she was an exceptionally difficult woman to live with (one relative had
turned her out, and no others would take her in). Id. at 392-93.
134 29 Va. (2 Leigh) 300 (1830).
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purchasers from either the wife or husband. But there is none
such in this case. A husband is not a purchaser of his wife's
13
property by the marriage.
Judge Brooke, by contrast, held that the husband's claim was good:
his "marital rights. . . had attached upon the property in her slaves,"
and thus "[h]is will and not her's [sic] was to be consulted."136 The
results-and the opinions-in Thrift v. Hannah are exactly what
might be expected in a case involving a claimant who was in some
sense midway between creditor and heir.
Another common fact pattern allowed judges to conclude, in essence,
that there was no conflict between natural rights because the slaveowner had somehow forfeited his property right. The court held as
early as 1811 that while legislatures may not deprive citizens of an
"inherent" right, "they may regulate the manner. . . of its exercise.' 37
One such regulation was a 1792 law requiring anyone bringing slaves
into the state to swear an oath that the slaves were not brought in
for the purpose of sale. Moreover, only citizens of other states were
permitted even this grace; Virginia citizens were absolutely prohibited
from importing slaves. Slaves brought into Virginia in derogation of
the 1792 act, and remaining there for a year, were legally entitled to
freedom. Between 1805 and 1829, the Virginia court freed slaves in
six cases involving transportation into or out of Virginia.' 38 In only
two cases during this period, both in 1821, did the court deny petitions
39
for freedom in this context.'
In several cases, the slave-owner's failure to comply with the law
in every technical particular led the court to grant petitions for
freedom. In Murray v. M'Carty, 40 a Virginian resettled in Maryland,
purchased a slave there, and eventually returned permanently to
Virginia (with the slave) and took the prescribed oath. The court
nevertheless granted the slave's petition for freedom. The court reasoned that importation was permitted only by citizens of other states,
and that the defendant had never sufficiently renounced his Virginia
3I Id. at 316.
'1 Id. at 320; see also id. at 318 (Judge Cabell stating: "By the marriage of Rachel Magruder,
in this case, she ceased to be the owner of the slaves, which thereby became the property of
her husband.")
"1 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 394, 397 (1811).
138 Hunter v. Fulcher, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 172 (1829); M'Michen v. Amos, 25 Va. (4
Rand.) 134
(1826); Griffith v. Fanny, 21 Va. (Gilmer) 143 (1820); Garnett v. Sam, 19 Va. (5 Munf.) 542
(1817); Murray v. M'Carty, 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 394 (1811); Wilson v. Isbell, 9 Va. (5 Call) 425

(1805).

,19Lewis v. Fullerson, 22 Va. (1 Rand.) 15 (1821); Barnett v. Sam, 21 Va. (Gilmer) 232 (1821).
140

16 Va. (2 Munf.) 394 (1811).
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citizenship to qualify.14 ' In M'Michen v.Amos,1 4 a Maryland citizen
brought his slaves with him to Virginia. He, however, failed to take
the oath: his wife took it instead. The court held that insufficient,
44
43
and granted the slaves' petitions for freedom. In Garnett v. Sam,
the court freed two slaves because their erstwhile owner could not
prove that he had taken the oath when he had brought them into
the state almost thirty years earlier. 45 While in none of these cases
did the court frame the issue as a forfeiture of otherwise vested
property rights, an argument can be made that that potential characterization colored their views and allowed them to free the slaves
without depriving their owners of any vested property rights.
A similar argument can be made about two cases involving slaves
purchased in or taken to free states. An owner who attempted to
take his property into a state which put him on notice that if he did
so the property would be confiscated, was often said to have forfeited
all rights in the property. Thus, in Hunter v. Fulcher 46 the Virginia
court freed a slave who had been taken by his Virginia master to
reside in Maryland for twelve years, and then returned with him to
Virginia. Maryland law at the time freed all imported slaves. Judge
Green noted that the master had "voluntarily becom[e] a permanent
member of [the Maryland] community, and submitt[ed] himself and
his property to the full force of the laws of Maryland."1 47 He thus
141Id. at 398. Similarly, in Wilson, 9 Va. (5 Call) 425, a Virginian who moved to Maryland
sold a slave (who had come with him from Virginia) to another Virginian; the latter took her
back to his home in Virginia. The court granted the slave's petition for freedom because the
new owner was not a citizen of another state. Id. at 429. Ironically, the original owner also
returned to Virginia. As the court noted, had he not sold Isbell to Wilson, he would have been
entitled to bring her back with him. Id. The statute explicitly exempted slaves who were owned
by Virginians at the time of enactment, allowing those owners to remove them from the state
and then bring them back.
4225 Va. (4 Rand.) 134 (1826).
1' The court considered this a very easy question. The jury had found the facts as described
in the text, but had left to the judge to determine whether "the law be for the defendant,"
and if so "then they find for the defendant." Id. Counsel for the defendant on appeal had
suggested that the jury could not possibly be suggesting that the wife's taking the oath might
be legally sufficient: "[T]his question is so plain that [the court] cannot presume the parties
intended to submit it: that no lawyer would have made it, nor would the Judge have suffered
it to be put upon the record." Id. at 138-39. The court responded that "[i]f the records of this
Court be searched, it would be found that questions as plain (plainer there could not be) have
been often made, and in some instances, incorrectly decided, in the Inferior Courts." Id. at
139.
'"19 Va. (5 Munf.) 542 (1817).
Id. at 545.
14128 Va. (1 Leigh) 172 (1829).
147Id.
at 181. Judge Carr similarly noted that the defendant had "voluntarily subject[ed]
himself and the slave to the operation of [Maryland's] laws." Id. at 182. The last judge, Judge
Cabell, concurred in the judgment without opinion.
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concluded that freeing the slave would give effect "to those laws,
operating on the rights of persons, who were to all intents and purposes
justly subjected to them, and touching the rights of no others."'' 14
The law of Maryland had operated to deprive the defendant of his
property rights in the slave, and, hence, no conflict of natural rights
remained. In Griffith v. Fanny,149 the forfeiture of rights was even
more apparent: an Ohio citizen had attempted to evade the Ohio
prohibition against slavery by having the bill of sale for his purchase
of a slave drawn up in Griffith's name, Griffith being a citizen of
Virginia. The court affirmed the grant of Fanny's petition for freedom
without opinion. Counsel for Fanny, however, had argued that "[t]he
residence of Fanny in Ohio, by the consent and connivance of Griffith,
dissolved the connection of master and slave, and Fanny is free."'' 0
Again, the slave-owner had forfeited his rights.
In other cases, the facts did not so conveniently allow the court
to evade a conflict of natural rights by implicitly finding a forfeiture.
As in the cases involving truly unsatisfied creditors, the court in the
5
following cases denied the petitions for freedom. In Lewis v. Fullerson' '
(later distinguished in Hunter),'52 petitioner claimed his freedom partly
on the ground that before his birth his mother had become free by
spending part of one day in the free state of Ohio. The court rejected
this argument on the ground that she had been there "in the absence
of her master, and without any evidence that it was with his permission."'' 53 Thus, the court implicitly held that the owner had not
148Id.

at 181.

"121
Va. (Gilmer) 143 (1820).
50
Id. at 144-45.
""22 Va. (1 Rand.) 15 (1821).
152 In Lewis, the slave was only temporarily in the other state, whereas in Hunter, the slave
was taken outside of Virginia by a resident of Maryland, who acquired the slave, for twelve
years. Hunter v. Fulcher, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 172, 180-81 (1829).
'3 Lewis 22 Va. (I Rand.) at 22. The Lewis case is something of an anomaly. The plaintiff
also claimed that his mother had been freed by court order in Ohio, and by a deed of manumission
executed in Ohio by her Virginia owner. Neither ground was sufficient, according to the court.
The court's rejection of the Ohio court's power to free a Virginia slave rested on a fear of the
consequences of any other ruling:
The right of our citizens under the constitution to reclaim their fugative [sic] slaves from
other states, would be nearly a nullity, if that claim [were permitted to be intercepted by]
a proceeding like the one in question; a proceeding of so extremely summary a character,
that it affords no fair opportunity to a master deliberately to support his right of property
in his slave.
Id. at 23. The deed was apparently executed as the only way of persuading the slave-newly
freed by the Ohio court-to return voluntarily to Virginia. I suspect that Lewis may have
involved either a fugitive slave or an Ohio court that did not respect the generally accepted
doctrine that mere transit through a free state, with no intent to become a resident, did not
deprive an owner of his slaves. For the northern acceptance of that doctrine in this period, see
P. FINKELMAN, supra note 116, at 46-69, 70.
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forfeited his rights. Barnett v. Sam154 entailed a double problem of
innocent property rights. Sam's original owner took him from Virginia
to North Carolina, and brought him back after 1792 without complying
with the statute. The statute, however, specifically exempted slaves
owned by Virginians at the time of enactment, and thus the original
owner had not violated any provision of the statute. Moreover, Sam
remained her slave in Virginia for another eighteen years, and was
then sold to Barnett. Several years later, Sam brought suit. Thus,
the original owner had not forfeited her rights, and even if she had,
Barnett was an innocent third party. The court denied Sam's petition
on the ground that the 1792 statute did not apply to his original
owner. 155

Thus, a careful examination of the cases involving petitions for
freedom suggests that a solicitude for property rights had a significant
influence on the court, counteracting the tendency to favor liberty.
Moreover, as is common where two fundamental principles collide,
the court tried whenever possible to avoid a direct conflict.'56
B.

The Language of Individual Cases

Many of the cases also contain language directly reflecting a judicial
awareness that petitions for freedom raised a conflict between two
natural rights. That liberty was itself a natural right of persons had
long been recognized, and was reflected in the much repeated phrase,
"liberty is to be favored."15 7 As counsel for defendants frequently
reminded the court, however, "although it may be true that liberty
is to be favored, the rights of property are as sacred as those of
liberty."' 15 8 In one case, counsel for the petitioning slave noted that
11421

Va. (Gilmer) 232 (1821).
at 233-34.
156 For an example of this in the context of the conflict between two types of property rights,
155Id.

see 3-4 G.

EDWARD WHITE,

supra note 1, at 628-48.

- Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319, 324 (1800) (argument of counsel); see also id.
at 335-36 (Judge Roane declaring that ordinary legal arguments in favor of petitioners "hold,
with increased force, when the case is considered in its true point of view, as one, which
involves human liberty"); Charles v. Hunnicutt, 9 Va. (5 Call) 311, 322-23, 330 (1804); Isaac
v. West's Ex'r, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 652, 657 (1828). See generally P. FINKELMAN, supra note 116,
at 187-234.
158Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 324 (argument of counsel); see also Whiting v. Daniel, 11 Va.
(1 Hen. & M.) 390, 400 (1806) (argument of counsel) ("In this Court, the case now under
consideration, will be decided not as a case of freedom, but in the same manner as if [the
manumittor] had given her property to others, or had died intestate."); Hudgins v. Wrights,
11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134, 136 (1806) (argument of counsel) ("In deciding upon the rights of
property, those rules which have been established are not to be departed from, because freedom
is in question.").
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"we all agree" that a claim for freedom "must stand on precisely the
same ground with any question of property."' 59 Judge Roane, despite
his discomfort with slavery, was careful to note the validity of the
opposing right in Patty v. Colin: "The spirit of the decisions of this
Court in relation to suits for freedom, while it neither abandons the
rules of evidence, nor the rules of law as applying to property, with
a becoming liberality respects the merit of the claim, and the general
imbecility of the claimants."' 60 Judge Cabell wrote in 1829 that "the
right to emancipate slaves is subordinate to the obligation to pay
debts previously contracted."' 6 ' Perhaps the most succinct articulation
of the conflict came in an 1824 case denying a petition for freedom:
' 62
"Emancipation is an utter destruction of the right of property.'
The judges also frequently reminded the public that a decision to
free a particular slave did not trample on property rights. Sometimes
they noted explicitly that no individual's vested rights were at stake.
In Wilson v. Isbell, the court was quick to note that "[t]he question
has nothing to do with the rights of Mr. Whiting, her former master." 63 In Spotts v. Gillespie, the court held that "[t]he . . . question
• . . as to the power of the State of Pennsylvania to confiscate the
property of a citizen of Virginia, does not directly occur."' 64 In Pleasants v. Pleasants65 the court upheld a testamentary manumission
despite the fact that manumission became legal only after the death
of the testator. Judge Roane deliberately began his analysis in Pleasants by considering the claim to freedom "only, as that of ordinary
remaindermen, claiming property in them[selves], and endeavor[ed]
to test it by the rules of the common law, relative to ordinary cases
of limitation of personal chattels."' 66 In one case not involving freedom, the court emphasized that the rights of slave and master were
in fact congruent: "it is as important for the interest of the [master],
as for the safety of the [slave], that a stranger should not be permitted
to exercise an unrestrained and lawless authority over him."' 67
Moreover, the court did not neglect to assuage the fears of those
who foresaw the end oi slavery as an institution-and thus of judicial

M

Talbert v. Jenny, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 159, 161 (1828) (argument of counsel). The court
affirmed the Chancellor's granting of Jenny's petition for freedom. Id. at 165.
,6011 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 519, 529 (1807).
16, Dunn v. Amey, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 465, 472 (1829).
62 Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228, 231 (1824).
163 9 Va. (5 Call) 425, 429 (1805).
164 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 566, 572 (1828).
1616 Va. (2 Call) 319 (1800).
"6

167

Id. at 335-36.

Commonwealth v. Carver, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 660, 665 (1827).
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protection for property-with each decision to grant a petition for
freedom. Judge Tucker noted in Hudgins that his decision to free
the petitioners did "not by a side wind . . . overturn the rights of
property."' 168 Judge Roane explained that he had freed petitioners in
Pleasants"upon grounds . . . of strict legal right, and not upon such
grounds, as, if sanctioned by the decision of this court, might agitate
and convulse the Commonwealth to its centre."169 The Virginia judges
were not only aware that petitions for freedom potentially raised a
conflict between inherent unwritten rights, they knew the political
consequences of leaning too much in favor of the right to liberty.
Thus, both the decisions and the judges' opinions reflect a tension
between two of the most venerable rights in the natural law pantheon.
It is no wonder that the judiciary could not resolve the issue of
slavery, nor that in the decades just preceding the Civil War southern
judges ultimately took refuge in a narrow formalism that eliminated
questions of unwritten law or stressed the property aspects of fun170
damental rights.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Like their state predecessors and their federal counterparts, Virginia
judges between 1790 and 1830 looked to unwritten, as well as written,
sources of law. Drawing upon a rich tradition of natural rights, they
combined reason, history, and judgment to grapple with the issues
that came before them. Though their resolution of those issues would
not be ours, their commitment to doing justice might be worth
emulating.
Recourse to unwritten fundamental law is not a panacea for social
injustice. Extra-textual interpretation, like textual interpretation, depends on the judges who engage in it. It yields more or less just
results depending on the commitments and the consciences of judges
and lawyers, the receptivity of the citizenry, and the bounds of the
legal imagination.

' Hudgins v. Wrights, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134, 141 (1806).
,69Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319, 344 (1800).
70 See R. COVER, supra note 31, at 232-36. But see Nelson, supra note 117, at 528-38
(describing formalism as an antislavery response to the perceived relationship between instrumentalism and proslavery jurisprudence).
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